

CIA Order of Battle Conference
July 1970

STATINTL

11 Jun 70 [REDACTED] to DCI memo re Proposed Conference to Revise
Estimates of Strengths of VC/NVA Forces

Attachment: Helms to Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett, DIA,
memo, dated 12 Jun 70, re Conference
to Revise Estimates of Strengths of
VC/NVA Forces

12 Jun 70 CIA Order of Battle Conference (time, purpose, partici-
pation, requirements, scope) LDX'd to [REDACTED] DIA,
as guidance for outgoing cable to CINCPAC and MACV
announcing the OB conference

STATINTL

15 Jun 70 Blind Memo re Revision of Intelligence Estimates of
VC/NVA Forces

Attachments: Hand-written note re request from
[REDACTED] for info on estimates of
enemy strengths in Cambodia/SVN
border regions; VC recruiting in
Cambodia; friendly troop disposition;
latest supply losses

STATINTL

Blind Memo re VC/NVA Forces in Cambodia

Blind Memo, dated 8 Jun 70, re Communist
Recruitment of Ethnic Cambodians

22 Jun 70 Lt. Gen. Bennett to DCI memo re Conference to Revise
Estimates of Strength of VC/NVA Forces (agreeing to
proposed conference)

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File


SECRET

12 June 1970

CIA Order of Battle Conference

- I. Time and Location: The conference will convene no later than 15 July 1970 at CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia. It will last for a period of 7-10 days.
- II. Purpose: The conference has been called by the Director of Central Intelligence who desires the participation of DIA and the field commands before publishing his revised estimates of the enemy forces in South Vietnam. The conference is directed specifically to do the following:
1. Make revisions to existing order of battle estimates on the basis of the new unit identifications resulting from exploitation of the documentation acquired during the current Cambodian operations and other relevant data.
 2. Make any necessary changes in the strength figures assigned to units already listed in existing order of battle holdings.
 3. Examine implications of these revisions on aggregative order of battle estimates and make changes as required.
- III. Participation: The conference is intended as a meeting of working level order of battle specialists, principally from CIA, DIA, CINCPAC and MACV. Other organizations represented at the conference will participate in observer status.
- Delegations to the conference should include at least three working level specialists to participate in panel sessions.

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IV. Requirements:

- Delegates should have SI clearance.
- Each delegation is expected to deposit with the conference the results of its exploitation of the relevant intelligence materials for consideration in panel sessions. This requirement is particularly important for MACV since it has more immediate and broader access to captured documents.


V. Scope: As a general rule the conference will concern itself with those categories of enemy forces which are included in the military threat as shown in published CIA-DIA agreed estimates.

OER/CIA

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STATINTL

~~MEMORANDUM FOR:~~

The attached was LDX'd to
 DIAAP-4 as guidance
for an outgoing cable to CINCPAC
& MACV announcing the OB conference.

[Signature]

12 June 1970
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 June 1970

MEMORANDUM


SUBJECT: Revision of Intelligence Estimates of VC/NVA
Forces

1. The current military operations in Cambodia have unearthed a large number of captured documents which provide detailed information on the organization and strength of the enemy forces operating in Cambodia and/or along the border areas of South Vietnam. The documents are proving to be particularly valuable because they are providing information on units and areas about which our previous knowledge was quite scant. Our examination of the new evidence indicates that revision of the current estimates is imperative and that these revisions may be substantial.

2. Preliminary analysis suggests that the current estimates understate the strength of the enemy's Regular forces (Main/Local Forces and Administrative Service Troops) by something on the order of 30,000 men. An adjustment of this magnitude would mean an increase of about 15 percent in the current estimate.

3. It is important to note, however, that the larger part of the correction will be for the Administrative Services category. A good part of the correction will reflect the identification of previously unknown units, or units whose existence was known but without any idea of their personnel strength. It appears that the community's estimates of combat forces have been very close to the mark but that we have been understating the manpower requirements needed to maintain and support the combat effort, particularly for those support forces located in Cambodia. The adjustments to be made to the estimates of combat forces will run less than 10,000.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

4. The following examples provide some very preliminary approximations of some of the adjustments that seem to be in order. The estimate for COSVN military components will probably be increased by about 15,000. Some 1,500 of these are personnel in previously unidentified sapper battalions. Another 4,500 are the personnel of three newly identified regiments that are responsible for the support and movement of infiltrating personnel coming into the COSVN area and also the large flow of sick and wounded leaving the area. In the B-3 front -- to the north of the COSVN area -- the documents provide strengths, for the first time, of the four Binh Trams, or logistics stations, known to be located in Cambodia and extending southward from Laos along the South Vietnamese border. These four units total about 3,000 men. Although the documents verify the estimated unit structure for combat forces in the B-3 front area, they also seem to indicate that their aggregate strengths have been underestimated by some 3,000-4,000 men.

5. These estimates are, of course, highly important to an understanding of enemy capabilities and a considerable amount of detailed analysis is in order before revisions can be officially made. To facilitate this work, Mr. Helms had directed that a conference of order of battle specialists be convened no later than 15 July 1970. The conference will be chaired by CIA. DIA, CINCPAC and MACV have been invited to participate.

6. Finally, it is interesting to note that apart from the issue of estimates of military forces, the captured documents are providing a considerable amount of detailed information on the structure and strength of COSVN's political apparatus. This was formerly estimated at 2,500, but the newly captured documents put its personnel strength at about 8,000. This figure includes a regiment of security troops subordinate to the Security Section (police).

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STATINTL

10:45 stating that the
DDCI needed by 11:15

info on following:

Estimates of enemy
force strengths in Cambodian/
S.V. border regions

Info about VC recruiting
in Cambodia

Friendly troop disposition

Latest supply losses.

We supplied following.
From Ron, enclosed

Thermofax

update of Supply

losses thru 7 June

Copy last week's

*Supply loss report
a November 69*

*report (and map) of insurgent
activity in Cambodia.*

Report was from

[REDACTED]

STATINTL

STATINTL

[REDACTED]

*Weekly up-date by
TLC on Troop dispositions
attached memo by
Rylander on recruitment.
all items were ~~more~~
responsive to request.*

General Cushman

impressed by weekly TLC

~~Report and indicated~~
he would like a copy
each week. ~~Also indicated~~
~~it should get~~

Frank

BEST COPY
Available

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500050001-9

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Communist Recruitment of Ethnic Cambodians

Vietnamese Communist recruitment of ethnic Cambodians has apparently been extensive primarily in the southern and eastern parts of the country. It has played primarily upon pro-Sihanouk sentiments. However, the loyalties of the Cambodians are apparently superficial and often melt in combat. Some sources indicate that extensive indoctrination will be needed to fully incorporate the Cambodians into the Communist structure. Vietnamese Communists are probably also present in Khmer Rouge military units although the extent of Vietnamese control is unknown.

8 June 1970
OER/I/TLC

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution of attached

1 - DDCI
1 - SAVA
1 - O/DD/I
1 - ONE
1 - OCI
✓ 1 - DD/OER
1 - Ch/D/I
1 - Ch/I/SV
3 - St/P/C

15 JUN 1970

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

The attached OER statement on the pending revision of estimates of VC/NVA forces was prepared for meeting today with Mr. Packard.

Acting Director
Economic Research

15 June 70
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

STATINTL

Statement on revision of OB estimates for your meeting with Mr. Packard. OER has made internal Agency distribution.

[REDACTED]
Acting Director
Economic Research

15 June 70
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DD/I
Attn: [REDACTED]

STATINTL

Statement in re revision of OB estimates prepared for [REDACTED] meeting today with Mr. Packard.

[REDACTED]
Acting Director
Economic Research

15 June 70
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

STATINTL

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

OER statement in re revision of
OB estimates prepared for [REDACTED]
meeting today with Mr. Packard.

[REDACTED]
Acting Director
Economic Research

15 June 70
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

OER statement in re revision of
OB estimates prepared for [REDACTED]
meeting today with Mr. Packard.

[REDACTED]
Acting Director
Economic Research

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Executive Registry

70-3866/2

DDI-1646-70

S-2240/AP-4A

22 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conference to Revise Estimates of Strength of VC/NVA Forces (U)

Reference: CIA memorandum, subject as above, dated 12 June 1970.

1. (S) I wholeheartedly agree that a VC/NVA order-of-battle conference should be held to exploit documentary information which has become available as a result of the Allied operations in Cambodia. In my view, the conference should not be convened until mid-July to allow the participants maximum time to review all relevant data.
2. (S) The field commands, MACV in particular, should play an invaluable role in the conference; to my knowledge MACV elements are the only ones which have had a good opportunity to review new data first hand. I have dispatched a message to CINCPAC/MACV advising of the conference objectives and emphasizing the necessity of their participation.
3. (S) If exploitation of currently available material is not sufficient to allow definitive conclusions, the conference should help to identify areas on which priority attention should be focused. The conference can also provide the opportunity to examine some of the side issues vital to over-all strength considerations, e.g., losses and attrition among southbound infiltration groups.
4. (U) My action officer for the conference is LTC Roy J. Herte, Jr., DIAAP-4A2 (Ext 53932).

B. V. Bennett

B. V. BENNETT
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

29 JUN 1970

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION:
DDI DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM	
CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	The Director	25 SEP 70	JK
2	DD/T		H
3	DD/OER		
4			
5			
6			

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500050001-9

11 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Proposed Conference to Revise Estimates
of Strengths of VC/NVA Forces

1. The current military operations in Cambodia have unearthed a large number of captured documents which provide information showing that current estimates understate the strength of VC/NVA forces by a considerable margin. The understatement results in large measure from the identification of units previously unknown to the community. Although most of these units are administrative service or support types, the new evidence also shows that the current estimates of combat forces are also understated.

2. On 8 June Saigon press sources reported that MACV was raising its estimates of enemy forces in III Corps and adjacent Cambodian sanctuaries from 55,000 to 91,000 troops. This report has obviously attracted a great deal of attention in official Washington, particularly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Dr. Kissinger. CIA has already been asked to provide Acting Secretary Packard with a preliminary analysis of the revisions required in the current estimates.


3. DIA's position on the press reporting of MACV's changes was that the reports contained nothing new and that DIA has not increased the strength of the overall enemy threat estimate. I was asked to coordinate this position and refused on the grounds that the new evidence makes revisions of our estimates imperative and that these revisions may be substantial, in the order of 15-20 percent. I further informed DIA that this message would be loud and clear in our response to Mr. Packard.

4. DIA's reaction has been to suggest that a revision of the estimates is now in order and that this could best be handled by CIA convening a conference of order of battle specialists from DIA, CINCPAC and MACV.

5. The DIA suggestion seems to be a reasonable approach to revising our estimates. It would in the first instance be a further example of Agency initiative in resolution of national intelligence problems. Moreover, the community will have to face up to this question in very short order and the conference proposal has the not inconsiderable advantage of being done under our auspices rather than those of the VSSG Working Group. CIA sponsorship of the conference would also be of benefit to DIA in its relationships with the field commanders. Finally, I would note that the nature of the current problem and the marked improvement in our relations with MACV should mean that revised estimates could be achieved with much less of the wrangling and debate which characterized our conference in 1968.

6. For these reasons I recommend that CIA should agree to call the proposed conference. If you approve this recommendation, the attached memorandum to General Bennett, will initiate the proceedings.

25X1A


Deputy Director
Economic Research

Attachment:

Memorandum to General Bennett

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500050001-9



Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500050001-9

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	DDI		11 June	<i>[Signature]</i>	
2	DCI		11 JUN 1977	<i>[Signature]</i>	
3	DD/OER				
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p><i>Recommendation for the Director's action in para 6 of attached memo. Ed</i></p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
DD/OER 4F-18 5001					

12 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Donald V. Bennett
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense

SUBJECT : Conference to Revise Estimates of
Strengths of VC/NVA Forces

1. It has come to my attention that the large volume of documents being unearthed during the current operations in Cambodia provides convincing evidence that current estimates understate the strength of VC/NVA forces by a considerable margin. The recent airing of this issue in the press and the strong interest being expressed at the highest levels of this Government make it imperative that the question of revising our estimates be resolved as quickly as possible.

2. In my capacity as Director of Central Intelligence, I would prefer that our revisions of the current national estimates be made, if possible, with the participation of DIA as well as the field commands. To this end I plan to convene at CIA Headquarters a working level conference of order-of-battle specialists to begin no later than 15 July 1970. In addition to the participation of DIA, I would appreciate it if you would make the necessary arrangements for the participation of representatives from CINCPAC and MACV and such other organizations as you deem appropriate.

3. [REDACTED] will chair this conference. He can be reached on code 143, extension 5001.

/s/ Richard Helms


Richard Helms
Director

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency from
the Director (SUBJECT: Conference to Revise Estimates of
Strengths of VC/NVA Forces)

CONCUR:


Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

11 JUN 1970

Date

DD/OER: :ajs

25X1A

Retyped ADDI:EWProctor:fbr (11 June 1970)

Distribution:

25X1A

Original and 1 - Addressee

- 1 - Director
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - Executive Registry
- 1 - DDI
- 2 - OD/OER
- (1) - DD/OER
- 1 - Ch/D/I
- 1 - Ch/I/SV

SECRET

